Bump Seed Canonicalization
Summary
- The
create_program_addressfunction derives a PDA without searching for the canonical bump. This means there are multiple valid bumps, all of which will produce different addresses. - Using
find_program_addressensures that the highest valid bump, or canonical bump, is used for the derivation, thus creating a deterministic way to find an address given specific seeds. - Upon initialization, you can use Anchor's
seedsandbumpconstraint to ensure that PDA derivations in the account validation struct always use the canonical bump - Anchor allows you to specify a bump with the
bump = <some_bump>constraint when verifying the address of a PDA - Because
find_program_addresscan be expensive, best practice is to store the derived bump in an account’s data field to be referenced later on when re-deriving the address for verification#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct VerifyAddress<'info> {
#[account(
seeds = [DATA_PDA_SEED.as_bytes()],
bump = data.bump
)]
data: Account<'info, Data>,
}
Lesson
Bump seeds are a number between 0 and 255, inclusive, used to ensure that an
address derived using
create_program_address
is a valid PDA. The canonical bump is the highest bump value that produces a
valid PDA. The standard in Solana is to always use the canonical bump when
deriving PDAs, both for security and convenience.
Insecure PDA derivation using create_program_address
Given a set of seeds, the create_program_address function will produce a valid
PDA about 50% of the time. The bump seed is an additional byte added as a seed
to "bump" the derived address into valid territory. Since there are 256 possible
bump seeds and the function produces valid PDAs approximately 50% of the time,
there are many valid bumps for a given set of input seeds.
You can imagine that this could cause confusion for locating accounts when using seeds as a way of mapping between known pieces of information to accounts. Using the canonical bump as the standard ensures that you can always find the right account. More importantly, it avoids security exploits caused by the open-ended nature of allowing multiple bumps.
In the example below, the set_value instruction uses a bump that was passed
in as instruction data to derive a PDA. The instruction then derives the PDA
using create_program_address function and checks that the address matches
the public key of the data account.
use anchor_lang::prelude::*;
declare_id!("Fg6PaFpoGXkYsidMpWTK6W2BeZ7FEfcYkg476zPFsLnS");
#[program]
pub mod bump_seed_canonicalization_insecure {
use super::*;
pub fn set_value(ctx: Context<BumpSeed>, key: u64, new_value: u64, bump: u8) -> Result<()> {
let address =
Pubkey::create_program_address(&[key.to_le_bytes().as_ref(), &[bump]], ctx.program_id).unwrap();
if address != ctx.accounts.data.key() {
return Err(ProgramError::InvalidArgument.into());
}
ctx.accounts.data.value = new_value;
Ok(())
}
}
#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct BumpSeed<'info> {
data: Account<'info, Data>,
}
#[account]
pub struct Data {
value: u64,
}
While the instruction derives the PDA and checks the passed-in account, which is good, it allows the caller to pass in an arbitrary bump. Depending on the context of your program, this could result in undesired behavior or potential exploit.
If the seed mapping was meant to enforce a one-to-one relationship between PDA and user, for example, this program would not properly enforce that. A user could call the program multiple times with many valid bumps, each producing a different PDA.
Recommended derivation using find_program_address
A simple way around this problem is to have the program expect only the
canonical bump and use find_program_address to derive the PDA.
The
find_program_address
always uses the canonical bump. This function iterates through calling
create_program_address, starting with a bump of 255 and decrementing the bump
by one with each iteration. As soon as a valid address is found, the function
returns both the derived PDA and the canonical bump used to derive it.
This ensures a one-to-one mapping between your input seeds and the address they produce.
pub fn set_value_secure(
ctx: Context<BumpSeed>,
key: u64,
new_value: u64,
bump: u8,
) -> Result<()> {
let (address, expected_bump) =
Pubkey::find_program_address(&[key.to_le_bytes().as_ref()], ctx.program_id);
if address != ctx.accounts.data.key() {
return Err(ProgramError::InvalidArgument.into());
}
if expected_bump != bump {
return Err(ProgramError::InvalidArgument.into());
}
ctx.accounts.data.value = new_value;
Ok(())
}
Use Anchor’s seeds and bump constraints
Anchor provides a convenient way to derive PDAs in the account validation struct
using the seeds and bump constraints. These can even be combined with the
init constraint to initialize the account at the intended address. To protect
the program from the vulnerability we’ve been discussing throughout this lesson,
Anchor does not even allow you to initialize an account at a PDA using anything
but the canonical bump. Instead, it uses find_program_address to derive the
PDA and subsequently performs the initialization.
use anchor_lang::prelude::*;
declare_id!("Fg6PaFpoGXkYsidMpWTK6W2BeZ7FEfcYkg476zPFsLnS");
#[program]
pub mod bump_seed_canonicalization_recommended {
use super::*;
pub fn set_value(ctx: Context<BumpSeed>, _key: u64, new_value: u64) -> Result<()> {
ctx.accounts.data.value = new_value;
Ok(())
}
}
// initialize account at PDA
#[derive(Accounts)]
#[instruction(key: u64)]
pub struct BumpSeed<'info> {
#[account(mut)]
payer: Signer<'info>,
#[account(
init,
seeds = [key.to_le_bytes().as_ref()],
// derives the PDA using the canonical bump
bump,
payer = payer,
space = 8 + 8
)]
data: Account<'info, Data>,
system_program: Program<'info, System>
}
#[account]
pub struct Data {
value: u64,
}
If you aren't initializing an account, you can still validate PDAs with the
seeds and bump constraints. This simply rederives the PDA and compares the
derived address with the address of the account passed in.
In this scenario, Anchor does allow you to specify the bump to use to derive
the PDA with bump = <some_bump>. The intent here is not for you to use
arbitrary bumps, but rather to let you optimize your program. The iterative
nature of find_program_address makes it expensive, so best practice is to
store the canonical bump in the PDA account's data upon initializing a PDA,
allowing you to reference the bump stored when validating the PDA in subsequent
instructions.
When you specify the bump to use, Anchor uses create_program_address with the
provided bump instead of find_program_address. This pattern of storing the
bump in the account data ensures that your program always uses the canonical
bump without degrading performance.
use anchor_lang::prelude::*;
declare_id!("CVwV9RoebTbmzsGg1uqU1s4a3LvTKseewZKmaNLSxTqc");
#[program]
pub mod bump_seed_canonicalization_recommended {
use super::*;
pub fn set_value(ctx: Context<BumpSeed>, _key: u64, new_value: u64) -> Result<()> {
ctx.accounts.data.value = new_value;
// store the bump on the account
ctx.accounts.data.bump = *ctx.bumps.get("data").unwrap();
Ok(())
}
pub fn verify_address(ctx: Context<VerifyAddress>, _key: u64) -> Result<()> {
msg!("PDA confirmed to be derived with canonical bump: {}", ctx.accounts.data.key());
Ok(())
}
}
// initialize account at PDA
#[derive(Accounts)]
#[instruction(key: u64)]
pub struct BumpSeed<'info> {
#[account(mut)]
payer: Signer<'info>,
#[account(
init,
seeds = [key.to_le_bytes().as_ref()],
// derives the PDA using the canonical bump
bump,
payer = payer,
space = 8 + 8 + 1
)]
data: Account<'info, Data>,
system_program: Program<'info, System>
}
#[derive(Accounts)]
#[instruction(key: u64)]
pub struct VerifyAddress<'info> {
#[account(
seeds = [key.to_le_bytes().as_ref()],
// guranteed to be the canonical bump every time
bump = data.bump
)]
data: Account<'info, Data>,
}
#[account]
pub struct Data {
value: u64,
// bump field
bump: u8
}
If you don't specify the bump on the bump constraint, Anchor will still use
find_program_address to derive the PDA using the canonical bump. As a
consequence, your instruction will incur a variable amount of compute budget.
Programs that are already at risk of exceeding their compute budget should use
this with care since there is a chance that the program’s budget may be
occasionally and unpredictably exceeded.
On the other hand, if you only need to verify the address of a PDA passed in without initializing an account, you'll be forced to either let Anchor derive the canonical bump or expose your program to unecessary risks. In that case, please use the canonical bump despite the slight mark against performance.
Lab
To demonstrate the security exploits possible when you don't check for the canonical bump, let's work with a program that lets each program user "claim" rewards on time.
1. Setup
Start by getting the code on the starter branch of
this repository.
Notice that there are two instructions on the program and a single test in the
tests directory.
The instructions on the program are:
create_user_insecureclaim_insecure
The create_user_insecure instruction simply creates a new account at a PDA
derived using the signer's public key and a passed-in bump.
The claim_insecure instruction mints 10 tokens to the user and then marks the
account's rewards as claimed so that they can't claim again.
However, the program doesn't explicitly check that the PDAs in question are using the canonical bump.
Have a look at the program to understand what it does before proceeding.
2. Test insecure instructions
Since the instructions don't explicitly require the user PDA to use the
canonical bump, an attacker can create multiple accounts per wallet and claim
more rewards than should be allowed.
The test in the tests directory creates a new keypair called attacker to
represent an attacker. It then loops through all possible bumps and calls
create_user_insecure and claim_insecure. By the end, the test expects that
the attacker has been able to claim rewards multiple times and has earned more
than the 10 tokens allotted per user.
it("Attacker can claim more than reward limit with insecure instructions", async () => {
const attacker = Keypair.generate();
await safeAirdrop(attacker.publicKey, provider.connection);
const ataKey = await getAssociatedTokenAddress(mint, attacker.publicKey);
let numClaims = 0;
for (let i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
try {
const pda = createProgramAddressSync(
[attacker.publicKey.toBuffer(), Buffer.from([i])],
program.programId,
);
await program.methods
.createUserInsecure(i)
.accounts({
user: pda,
payer: attacker.publicKey,
})
.signers([attacker])
.rpc();
await program.methods
.claimInsecure(i)
.accounts({
user: pda,
mint,
payer: attacker.publicKey,
userAta: ataKey,
})
.signers([attacker])
.rpc();
numClaims += 1;
} catch (error) {
if (error.message !== "Invalid seeds, address must fall off the curve") {
console.log(error);
}
}
}
const ata = await getAccount(provider.connection, ataKey);
console.log(
`Attacker claimed ${numClaims} times and got ${Number(ata.amount)} tokens`,
);
expect(numClaims).to.be.greaterThan(1);
expect(Number(ata.amount)).to.be.greaterThan(10);
});
Run anchor test to see that this test passes, showing that the attacker is
successful. Since the test calles the instructions for every valid bump, it
takes a bit to run, so be patient.
bump-seed-canonicalization
Attacker claimed 129 times and got 1290 tokens
✔ Attacker can claim more than reward limit with insecure instructions (133840ms)
3. Create secure instructions
Let's demonstrate patching the vulnerability by creating two new instructions:
create_user_secureclaim_secure
Before we write the account validation or instruction logic, let's create a new
user type, UserSecure. This new type will add the canonical bump as a field on
the struct.
#[account]
pub struct UserSecure {
auth: Pubkey,
bump: u8,
rewards_claimed: bool,
}
Next, let's create account validation structs for each of the new instructions. They'll be very similar to the insecure versions but will let Anchor handle the derivation and deserialization of the PDAs.
#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct CreateUserSecure<'info> {
#[account(mut)]
payer: Signer<'info>,
#[account(
init,
seeds = [payer.key().as_ref()],
// derives the PDA using the canonical bump
bump,
payer = payer,
space = 8 + 32 + 1 + 1
)]
user: Account<'info, UserSecure>,
system_program: Program<'info, System>,
}
#[derive(Accounts)]
pub struct SecureClaim<'info> {
#[account(
seeds = [payer.key().as_ref()],
bump = user.bump,
constraint = !user.rewards_claimed @ ClaimError::AlreadyClaimed,
constraint = user.auth == payer.key()
)]
user: Account<'info, UserSecure>,
#[account(mut)]
payer: Signer<'info>,
#[account(
init_if_needed,
payer = payer,
associated_token::mint = mint,
associated_token::authority = payer
)]
user_ata: Account<'info, TokenAccount>,
#[account(mut)]
mint: Account<'info, Mint>,
/// CHECK: mint auth PDA
#[account(seeds = ["mint".as_bytes().as_ref()], bump)]
pub mint_authority: UncheckedAccount<'info>,
token_program: Program<'info, Token>,
associated_token_program: Program<'info, AssociatedToken>,
system_program: Program<'info, System>,
rent: Sysvar<'info, Rent>,
}
Finally, let's implement the instruction logic for the two new instructions. The
create_user_secure instruction simply needs to set the auth, bump and
rewards_claimed fields on the user account data.
pub fn create_user_secure(ctx: Context<CreateUserSecure>) -> Result<()> {
ctx.accounts.user.auth = ctx.accounts.payer.key();
ctx.accounts.user.bump = *ctx.bumps.get("user").unwrap();
ctx.accounts.user.rewards_claimed = false;
Ok(())
}
The claim_secure instruction needs to mint 10 tokens to the user and set the
user account's rewards_claimed field to true.
pub fn claim_secure(ctx: Context<SecureClaim>) -> Result<()> {
token::mint_to(
CpiContext::new_with_signer(
ctx.accounts.token_program.to_account_info(),
MintTo {
mint: ctx.accounts.mint.to_account_info(),
to: ctx.accounts.user_ata.to_account_info(),
authority: ctx.accounts.mint_authority.to_account_info(),
},
&[&[
b"mint".as_ref(),
&[*ctx.bumps.get("mint_authority").unwrap()],
]],
),
10,
)?;
ctx.accounts.user.rewards_claimed = true;
Ok(())
}
4. Test secure instructions
Let's go ahead and write a test to show that the attacker can no longer claim more than once using the new instructions.
Notice that if you start to loop through using multiple PDAs like the old test, you can't even pass the non-canonical bump to the instructions. However, you can still loop through using the various PDAs and at the end check that only 1 claim happened for a total of 10 tokens. Your final test will look something like this:
it.only("Attacker can only claim once with secure instructions", async () => {
const attacker = Keypair.generate();
await safeAirdrop(attacker.publicKey, provider.connection);
const ataKey = await getAssociatedTokenAddress(mint, attacker.publicKey);
const [userPDA] = findProgramAddressSync(
[attacker.publicKey.toBuffer()],
program.programId,
);
await program.methods
.createUserSecure()
.accounts({
payer: attacker.publicKey,
})
.signers([attacker])
.rpc();
await program.methods
.claimSecure()
.accounts({
payer: attacker.publicKey,
userAta: ataKey,
mint,
user: userPDA,
})
.signers([attacker])
.rpc();
let numClaims = 1;
for (let i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
try {
const pda = createProgramAddressSync(
[attacker.publicKey.toBuffer(), Buffer.from([i])],
program.programId,
);
await program.methods
.createUserSecure()
.accounts({
user: pda,
payer: attacker.publicKey,
})
.signers([attacker])
.rpc();
await program.methods
.claimSecure()
.accounts({
payer: attacker.publicKey,
userAta: ataKey,
mint,
user: pda,
})
.signers([attacker])
.rpc();
numClaims += 1;
} catch {}
}
const ata = await getAccount(provider.connection, ataKey);
expect(Number(ata.amount)).to.equal(10);
expect(numClaims).to.equal(1);
});
bump-seed-canonicalization
Attacker claimed 119 times and got 1190 tokens
✔ Attacker can claim more than reward limit with insecure instructions (128493ms)
✔ Attacker can only claim once with secure instructions (1448ms)
If you use Anchor for all of the PDA derivations, this particular exploit is pretty simple to avoid. However, if you end up doing anything "non-standard," be careful to design your program to explicitly use the canonical bump!
If you want to take a look at the final solution code you can find it on the
solution branch of
the same repository.
Challenge
Just as with other lessons in this unit, your opportunity to practice avoiding this security exploit lies in auditing your own or other programs.
Take some time to review at least one program and ensure that all PDA derivations and checks are using the canonical bump.
Remember, if you find a bug or exploit in somebody else's program, please alert them! If you find one in your own program, be sure to patch it right away.